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 Non-technical summary 
 
Since 2004, the European Commission (EC) has taken a number of steps to develop a legal 
framework that allows victims of EU antitrust infringements to obtain compensation. In its 
Green Paper on damages actions for breach of antitrust rules, the EC (2005) concluded that 
the robust quantification of the caused damage is one of the key barriers to a further 
promotion of antitrust damages actions. Consequently, in the subsequent White Paper – 
published in 2008 – the EC announced the plan to derive a coherent economic framework 
which provides pragmatic, non-binding guidance on the quantification of harm. A first draft 
of this Guidance Paper was published in June 2011.     
Although the public and academic discourse on the various methods and models to estimate 
damages certainly is a necessary step in the process of strengthening antitrust damages 
actions, the challenges of applying them in actual cases with real-world data are often 
ignored. Given the fact that the final damage value basically is a function of the demanded 
quantities of the cartelized product and the cartel-induced increase in price, it becomes 
apparent that especially the robust estimation of the so-called price overcharge is crucial for a 
coherent and welfare-improving private enforcement of anti-cartel rules.   
Against this background, we use publicly available price data from a German cement cartel to 
estimate the achieved price overcharge. In particular, we apply two different comparator-
based approaches – a ‘before-and-after’ approach and a ‘difference-in-differences’ approach – 
and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel 
period to the non-cartel period on the estimated price overcharge. We find that the cartel 
managed to implement price increases in a range from 20.3% (extended approach with 
instrumented cement demand) to 20.7% (basic approach) for the ‘before-and-after’ method 
and from 26.2% (pooled OLS) to 26.5% (random-effects) for the ‘difference-in-differences’ 
method. For the (extended) ‘before-and-after’ approach, we further show that various 
assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period have a 
significant impact on the estimated price overcharge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Seit dem Jahr 2004 hat die Europäische Kommission eine Reihe von Schritten unternommen, 
einen rechtlichen Rahmen zu entwickeln, der es durch Wettbewerbsverstöße geschädigten 
Parteien erlaubt, eine entsprechende Kompensation zu erhalten. So veröffentlichte die 
Kommission beispielsweise im Jahr 2005 ein Grünbuch zur privatrechtlichen Durchsetzung 
des Kartellrechts, in dem sie insbesondere die vielfältigen Probleme einer Quantifizierung des 
entstehenden Schadens als eine große Hürde in der Umsetzung identifizierte. Im sich 
anschließenden Weißbuch aus dem Jahre 2008 kündigte die Kommission dann die 
Entwicklung von umfassenden aber unverbindlichen Richtlinien zur Schadensermittlung an. 
Ein erster Entwurf dieser Richtlinien wurde im Juni 2011 publiziert.    
Obwohl die aktuell stattfindende öffentliche wie wissenschaftliche Diskussion der 
verschiedenen Methoden und Modelle der Schadensermittlung ein wichtiger und notwendiger 
Schritt zur Stärkung der privatrechtlichen Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts ist, kommt die 
Würdigung der Herausforderungen einer praktischen Umsetzung der entsprechenden 
Methoden oftmals zu kurz. Da die finale Schadenssumme sowohl von den nachgefragten 
Mengen des Kartellgutes als auch dem kartellinduzierten Anstieg der Marktpreise abhängt, 
wird insbesondere die Bedeutung einer robusten Schätzung des sogenannten kartellbedingten 
Preisaufschlags für eine schlüssige und wohlfahrtserhöhende privatrechtliche Durchsetzung 
des Kartellverbots unmittelbar deutlich.   
Vor diesem Hintergrund nutzen wir öffentlich verfügbare Daten zu einem deutschen 
Zementkartell für eine Abschätzung des vom Kartell durchgesetzten Preisaufschlags. Konkret 
wenden wir zwei unterschiedliche komparatorenbasierte Schätzverfahren an – die Methode 
des zeitlichen Vergleichsmarkts und die ‚Difference-in-differences’-Methode – und 
untersuchen insbesondere den Einfluss verschiedener Annahmen im Hinblick auf die 
Übergangsperiode von der Kartellabsprache zum Wettbewerb auf die Höhe des 
Preisaufschlags. Unsere Schätzungen ergeben einen Preisaufschlag zwischen 20,3 Prozent 
(erweitertes Modell mit instrumentierter Zementnachfrage) und 20,7 Prozent (Basismodell) 
für die Methode des zeitlichen Vergleichsmarkts und zwischen 26,2 Prozent (‚pooled OLS’) 
und 26,5 Prozent (‚Random Effects’) für die ‚Difference-in-differences’-Methode. Für das 
erweiterte Modell des zeitlichen Vergleichsmarkts zeigen wir ferner, dass verschiedene 
Annahmen zur Übergangsperiode vom Kartell- zum Nicht-Kartellzeitraum einen 
signifikanten Einfluss auf den geschätzten Preisaufschlag haben.  
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Abstract  
We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartel-
induced price increase. We apply two different comparator-based approaches – the ‘before-
and-after’ approach and the ‘difference-in-differences’ approach – and especially study the 
impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel 
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1 Introduction 
The desire of firms to ease competitive pressures and increase joint profits through the 
implementation of cartel agreements has long been recognized by academics. Although Adam 
Smith’s (1776) famous statement on the social harmfulness of (price) coordination among 
competitors is usually seen as the foundation of a large literature on the economics of cartel 
agreements, the general concept of cartelization and the need for state intervention is already 
expressed quite clearly in manuscripts of Greek philosophers such as Aristotle1 (347 BC).  
 In the modern industrial organization literature, a hardcore cartel is typically defined as 
“… a group of firms who have agreed explicitly among themselves to coordinate their 
activities in order to raise market price – that is, they have entered into some form of price 
fixing agreement” (Pepall et al., 2001), p. 345). A perfectly functioning hardcore cartel – 
involving all firms in the market and referring to substitutive products – is expected to raise 
market price up to the monopoly level thereby harming overall and consumer welfare 
substantially. As hardcore cartels usually do not create any kind of benefits to society which 
could be traded-off against the anticompetitive effects, hardcore cartels are a prime example 
for a per se prohibition reflected in many antitrust legislations around the world.  
 An answer to the subsequent question after the design of an antitrust enforcement system 
for anti-cartel rules must refer to two different strands: public enforcement and private 
enforcement. Public enforcement basically means that antitrust rules are enforced by state 
authorities. Through the imposition of a threat of civil, administrative or criminal sanctions 
for violations of the respective laws and regulations, policy makers aim to alter the cost-
benefit assessment for forms of anticompetitive behavior on the firm’s side sufficiently to 
make compliance the dominant strategy.   
 By contrast, private enforcement is based on the actions of private parties – such as 
competitors, suppliers, customers or consumers – who can bring antitrust lawsuits based on 
the private damages caused by forms of anticompetitive behavior. Since 2004, the European 
Commission (EC) has taken a number of steps to develop a legal framework that allows 
victims of EU antitrust infringements to obtain compensation. In its Green Paper on damages 
actions for breach of antitrust rules, the EC (2005) concluded that the robust quantification of 
the caused damage is one of the key barriers to a further promotion of antitrust damages 
actions. Consequently, in the subsequent White Paper – published in 2008 – the EC 
announced the plan to derive a coherent economic framework which provides pragmatic, non-
                                                            
1  Aristotle, Politica (347 BC), Part XI. 
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binding guidance on the quantification of harm. A first draft of this Guidance Paper was 
published in June 2011.     
 Although the public and academic discourse on the various methods and models to 
estimate damages certainly is a necessary step in the process of strengthening antitrust 
damages actions, the challenges of applying them in actual cases with real-world data are 
often ignored. Given the fact that the final damage value basically is a function of the 
demanded quantities of the cartelized product and the cartel-induced increase in price, it 
becomes apparent that especially the robust estimation of the so-called price overcharge is 
crucial for a coherent and welfare-improving private enforcement of anti-cartel rules.   
 Against this background, we use publicly available price data from the German cement 
industry to estimate the achieved cartel price overcharge. In particular, we apply two different 
comparator-based approaches – a ‘before-and-after’ approach and a ‘difference-in-
differences’ approach – and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the 
transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period on the estimated price 
overcharge. We find that the cartel managed to implement price increases in a range from 
20.3 to 26.5 percent depending on model approach and model assumptions. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In the subsequent second section, we present a brief 
review of existing research on the estimation of price overcharges realized by hardcore 
cartels. We differentiate between a characterization of key empirical approaches and existing 
empirical evidence on the sizes of price overcharges. As an important precondition for a 
robust econometric analysis of the price overcharge is a profound understanding of both the 
respective market in general and the cartel agreement in particular, the third section 
concentrates on, first, an overview of the key economic characteristics of the cement market, 
and, second, a characterization of the latest German cement cartel. In the fourth section, we 
use publicly available price data to estimate the price overcharge of the German cement cartel. 
Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of its key results and a discussion of further 
research needs.  
 
2 Estimation of price overcharges – A review of the literature 
In this section, we present a brief review of existing research on the estimation of price 
overcharges of hardcore cartels. We differentiate between a characterization of key empirical 
approaches and existing empirical evidence on the sizes of price overcharges.  
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2.1 Empirical approaches 
Economic research has developed several classifications of methods to estimate price 
overcharges (see, e.g., van Dijk und Verboven, 2008; CEPS et al., 2007 and Oxera, 2009). For 
example, the seminal contribution by Oxera (2009) differentiates between three broad groups 
of methods: comparator-based, financial-performance-based, and market-structure-based. 
Comparator-based approaches use external data to estimate the price overcharge by a) cross-
sectional comparisons (comparing different geographic or product markets); b) time-series 
comparisons (analyzing prices before, during and/or after an infringement); and c) combining 
approaches a) and b) in a so-called ‘difference-in-differences’ model (e.g., analyzing the 
change in price for a cartelized market over time, and comparing this change against the 
change in price in a non-cartelized market over the same time period).  
 Financial-analysis-based approaches use financial information on comparator firms and 
industries, benchmarks for rates of return, and cost information on defendants and claimants 
to estimate the counterfactual. Examples for techniques in this category are the examination 
of financial performance such as profitability or bottom-up costing of the cartelized product to 
derive the ‘but-for’ price.  
 Market-structure-based approaches use a combination of theoretical models and empirical 
estimations to simulate a counterfactual estimate. Applying such an approach demands in a 
first step the identification of a theoretical model that fits best to the ‘relevant’ market (e.g., a 
Cournot oligopoly model or a Bertrand price competition model). Such a theoretical model 
helps in understanding how competition works in the respective market and how a reasonable 
‘but-for’ price should look like. In a second step, the respective model can be calibrated using 
standard econometric techniques.    
 The different methods to estimate ‘but-for’ prices differ significantly with respect to their 
input requirements, conceptual complexity, technical complexity and underlying assumptions. 
Given these differences and the diverse characteristics of real-world cartels, Oxera (2008) 
among others argues that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. To the contrary, it is not only 
necessary to identify the most suitable methods on a case-by-case basis. But it is also 
advisable to apply several methods in parallel in order to cross-check (or even pool) the 
results to arrive at a robust and reliable estimate of the ‘but-for’-price. In the following, we 
will characterize two empirical approaches out of the group of comparator-based tools in 
greater detail: the ‘before-and-after’ approach and the ‘difference-in-differences’ approach.   
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2.1.1 ,Before-and-after‘ approach 
The before-and-after approach basically compares the price during the cartel period with the 
price in the same market before and/or after the cartel period. On the one hand, the approach 
can be implemented by simply comparing the average prices between these periods. 
Alternatively, the price overcharge can be estimated by multivariate models that take relevant 
control variables into account. Multivariate models have the key advantage that they allow the 
inclusion of other determinants of the price in the cartel and non-cartel periods such as 
seasonal effects or technological changes (see, e.g., Connor, 2008).  
Technically, a multivariate comparison of the cartel period with the non-cartel period can 
be implemented by two distinct approaches. The ‘dummy variable’ approach introduces an 
indicator variable for the cartel period. This variable has a value of ‘1’ during the cartel period 
and a ‘0’ otherwise. The impact of this variable on price represents the cartel overcharge. The 
‘price prediction’ approach, however, predicts the prices in the cartel period on the basis of 
the prices in the non-cartel period given the change in market, companies and other 
characteristics in the cartel period. Depending on data availability, the prices before or after 
the cartel might be used to estimate the ‘but-for’ price. Ideally, both possibilities are executed 
and therefore allow conclusions on the robustness of the results (see Nieberding, 2006). 
The ‘before-and-after’ method has certain key advantages that explain its frequent 
application in overcharge estimations. First, data requirements are limited to time series of the 
respected cartelized product. Second, the economic concept behind the approach is quite 
straightforward thereby easing its application in court proceedings. Third, an estimation of the 
overcharge is technically relatively easy to implement and therefore suitable for 
implementation in a relatively short time window for the analysis. Fourth, it is not necessary 
to make any assumptions on industry conduct absent the cartel.  
These various advantages of the method have to be traded off against several potential 
disadvantages or challenges. In general, the performance of the ‚before-and-after’ approach 
depends on the degree to which prices before/after the cartel provide a good approximation of 
the competitive prices in the long-run equilibrium. It is therefore crucial to closely investigate 
industry and market conditions before and after the cartel (see ABA, 2010). If the post-cartel 
period is chosen as comparator, overcharges might on the one hand be underestimated due to 
a possible continuation of (possibly tacit) collusion among the former cartel members (see, 
e.g., Harrington, 2004a, 2004b). On the other hand, an overestimation is possible if the former 
cartel members reduce prices below the competitive level, either to calm down angry 
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customers (see Connor, 2008), or due to a price war that follows the breakdown of the cartel 
(see de Coninck, 2010).   
Due to the identified potential problems of the post-cartel period as comparator, van Dijk 
and Verboven (2008) among others propose to use the pre-cartel period as comparator. 
However, in addition to possible difficulties with respect to data availability, the pre-cartel 
period might also be special in the sense that, e.g., a recession took place that increased the 
desire among firms to form a cartel or a cartel was formed to end a period of ‘ruinous’ price 
competition in the industry (see, e.g., Brander und Ross, 2006). In both cases, the pre-cartel 
period would be a problematic reference period to derive the competitive market price. Last 
but not least, it is important to note that the derivation of the exact cartel period is not 
necessarily straightforward (see Friederiszick und Röller, 2010). As cartels typically do not 
collapse from one point in time to the other (e.g., due to long-term contractual relationships), 
the cartel duration identified as part of public enforcement might diverge from the cartel 
duration relevant for private enforcement (see, e.g., Brander and Ross, 2006; Verboven, 
2007). Ignoring the transition period from the cartel state to the non-cartel state is likely to 
lead to an inexact estimation of the price overcharge of the cartel. 
2.1.2 ,Difference-in-Differences‘ approach 
The ‚difference-in-differences’ (DiD) approach evaluates price developments at different 
points in time across different markets. The technique is therefore able to isolate the price 
effects of the cartel from both a time perspective and a geographic or product market 
perspective (see, e.g., Verboven, 2007).  
In principle, the DiD approach can be applied either qualitatively by simple comparisons of 
the average prices in markets with/without cartel presence or quantitatively by estimating the 
price overcharge through a multivariate regression approach. Table 1 shows the application of 
a DiD approach based on a simple comparison of average prices.   
Table 1: Example of a ‚difference-in-differences‘ model 
 Before-Cartel 
period 
Cartel Period Damage estimate 
Cartelized Market A B 
Non-Cartelized 
Market C D 
(B-A)-(D-C) 
Source: largely following Oxera (2009), p. 61. 
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The technique uses the average price on the cartelized market in the pre-cartel period (A) and 
the corresponding average prices for the cartelized market in the cartel period (B), the non-
cartelized market before the cartel (C) and the non-cartelized market in the cartel period (D). 
The difference (B-A) measures the change in the average price from the pre-cartel to the 
cartel period in the cartelized market while difference (D-C) shows the change in the average 
price on the comparator market. Although at first glance, one might think that the difference 
(B-A) is equal to the price overcharge of the cartel, a second look reveals that not necessarily 
the entire price difference (B-A) must be caused by the cartel agreement (e.g., because prices 
might have changed for other reasons such as cost changes during the cartel period). If the 
comparator market is most comparable to the cartelized market, the effect of these other 
drivers over time is expressed by (D-C) which must be lower than (B-A). Thus, the cartel 
effect in the cartelized market corresponds to the difference in the differences: (B-A)-(D-C).  
 Compared to the ‘before-and-after’ approach, the DiD model has substantially extended 
data requirements that often foreclose its application in practice. A key challenge in a 
meaningful application of the concept lies in the identification of a suitable comparator 
market, i.e., a market with similar demand, cost, and market structures. Ideally, these markets 
should neither be affected by (the same or other) cartels as well as other forms of 
anticompetitive behavior that might bias modeling results. However, as market characteristics 
for particular products are often similar in various countries, it is difficult to isolate a well 
suited comparator market for an application of a DiD approach. 
2.2 Empirical evidence  
Complementary to a characterization of empirical approaches to estimate the ‘but-for’ price, 
this section provides a brief overview of existing empirical evidence on the question ‘how 
high do cartels raise price’? A substantial number of studies exist that derive such overcharge 
estimates for various cartels in various industries and countries. Connor and Lande (2006) 
present a survey paper in which they include average overcharges of six economic surveys 
consisting of (in sum) more than 100 cartels. They find that the average cartel overcharges 
differ considerably between the different empirical studies. Levenstein and Suslow (2004), for 
instance, calculate an average overcharge (mean) of 43%, while Werden (2003) finds 21% 
(mean) and the OECD (2002) 15.75% for the average overcharge (mean). The total average 
overcharge of all studies shows a mean of 30.7%.  
 In a recent report, Oxera (2009) builds on a large data base of overcharges collected by 
Connor and Lande (2008) and further extends it to end up with more than 1000 observations 
on average overcharges from numerous cartels between 1780 and 2004. However, after 
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excluding data base entries of cartels before 1960, entries for which an average estimate of the 
overcharge over the whole cartel period was unavailable, studies where the method for 
calculating the overcharge was not explicitly referred to and studies which were not published 
in peer-reviewed academic articles and chapters in published books, the sample size was 
reduced substantially to 114. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of cartel overcharges of 
these 114 empirical studies of past cartels.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of cartel overcharges in empirical studies of past cartels 
Source: largely following Oxera (2009), p. 91. 
As revealed by Figure 1, the range with the greatest number of observations is 11–20%. 
According to Oxera (2009), the median overcharge is 18% of the cartel price while the (mean) 
average overcharge is found to be at around 20%. However, it is important to note that the 
sample of cartel overcharges is quite heterogeneous along several dimensions. For example, it 
contains 52 international and 62 national cartels. Out of the sub-group of national cartels, only 
six European cartels (where cartels covered several European countries) and nine (single-
country) European cartels are included leaving the large majority of national cartels referring 
to the United States or Canada. Interestingly, the North American cartels have a significantly 
smaller mean overcharge (16%) than the six European cartels (27%) in the data base. In 
general, the identified very limited evidence on the overcharges of particularly European 
cartels increases the relevance of our empirical analysis on the overcharge of a German 
cement cartel substantially.       
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3 The cement market and the German cement cartel 
An important precondition for a robust econometric analysis of the price overcharge of a 
hardcore cartel is a profound understanding of both the respective market in general and the 
cartel agreement in particular. As a consequence, this section concentrates on, first, an 
overview of the key economic characteristics of the cement market, and, second, a 
characterization of the latest German cement cartel.   
3.1 The cement market  
Cement can be broadly defined as a substance that sets and hardens independently, and can 
bind other materials together. Cement used in construction is largely so-called hydraulic 
cement that hardens when the anhydrous cement powder is mixed with water. Although 
cement is usually seen as a homogenous product, the current European standard EN 197-1 for 
common cements defines no less than 27 different cement types. However, a large fraction of 
the cement sales in most European countries refer to the so-called CEM I cement which 
contains only Portland cement clinker and no other possible constituents such as blast furnace 
slag, natural pozzolana, siliceous fly ash, burnt oil shale or limestone.  
 The cement production process can be subdivided into three main steps: the preparation of 
the raw mixture, the production of the clinker and the preparation of the cement. Cement 
producers tend to locate near the most important raw material source (which typically is lime). 
The production of the clinker through heating in a cement kiln is not only quite inflexible (in 
the sense that the costs per unit increase quickly with a reduction in capacity utilization) but is 
also particularly energy-intensive (which is why cement producers have started to (partly) 
replace clinker by other constituents during the final step of the preparation of the cement). In 
general, production characteristics suggest that high start-up costs are incurred with entry into 
the cement market, e.g. due to the necessary access to lime resources or the installation of 
production plants and mills.  
 The most common use for cement is in the production of concrete. Concrete is especially 
used in the construction industry either through the factory production of pre-cast units (such 
as panels, beams or road furniture), or through so-called ‘cast-in-place’ concrete needed for 
the construction of building superstructures, roads or dams. Given the seasonality of the 
construction business (with peaks in the summer months and a reduced activity in the winter 
months) cement demand follows comparable trends in most European countries.  
 In the sale of cement, transportation costs are a significant fraction of overall costs. This 
might suggest that the relevant geographical markets are more local. However, various 
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decisions in cartel and merger cases (e.g., by the European Commission) confirmed that 
cement is also profitably delivered over longer distances. The Commission concluded in this 
respect that the “relevant market is therefore Europe, made up of an overlapping pattern of 
interdependent markets.”2 Given such interdependence, cartel agreements are often intended 
to allocate the overall market. As a consequence, a largely local pattern of deliveries cannot 
necessarily be attributed to economic constraints to long distance deliveries. 
 A general tendency of cartelization of cement markets can be explained by the presence of 
various factors that ease the implementation and stability of collusive agreements. For 
example, cement markets are typically characterized by a low number of cement producers, a 
relatively homogenous product, high market entry barriers and a rather inflexible production 
process. Interestingly, the assumed vulnerability for cartelization is not only supported by 
theoretical arguments but also reflected in the cartel enforcement record. In addition to the 
detected German cement cartel characterized in the following section, cement cartels have 
been identified and punished on the European level (e.g. European Commission, 1994)3 and 
on the national level, such as in Norway, Sweden, France, Poland, India or the United States 
of America to name only a few. 
3.2 The German cement cartel4 
In summer 2002, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) announced the alleged existence of 
a hardcore cartel in the German cement market. In the course of the investigation, it was 
found that a large number of German cement producers divided up the German market by a 
quota system at least since the early 1990s. Following its detailed investigation, the FCO 
found substantial supra-competitive proceeds due to elevated cement prices and imposed 
overall fines of about EUR 702 million with EUR 606 million referring to the six largest 
German cement producers Dyckerhoff AG, HeidelbergCement AG, Lafarge Zement GmbH, 
Readymix AG, Schwenk Zement KG und Holcim (Deutschland) AG.   
 The existence of the cartel was disclosed to the FCO under the German leniency program 
by the cartel member Readymix AG. The Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf confirmed the 
illegal cartel agreements in its decision of 26 June 2009, however, reduced the fine level to a 
sum of EUR 329 million due to partly insufficient data. Fines totaling EUR 70 million 
                                                            
2  European Commission (1994), Commission imposes fines on a cement producers’ cartel, Press release on 30 
November 1994, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= IP/94/1108&format= 
HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last accessed on 12 May 2012). 
3   See European Commission decision of Cembureau. 
4  This section largely follows Friederiszick and Röller (2010). 
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became effective prior to the decision of the Higher Regional Court, because some cartel 
members did not appeal the decisions relating to those fines. 
 The proved existence of the cartel suggests that customers paid elevated prices for cement 
and were therefore harmed substantially. This assumption is supported by the substantial drop 
in the public price index for cement shown in Figure 2.     
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Figure 2: The public price index for cement from January 1990 to December 2009 
Source: Own graph following Friederiszick and Röller (2010), p. 599 
In addition to the general development of the public cement price index from January 1990 to 
December 2009, Figure 2 also marks key stages of the detection and prosecution of the 
cement cartel. The first indication of the cartel breakdown must be seen in the announcement 
of Readymix (in November 2001) to start replacing deliveries of other cartel members to its 
subsidiary concrete producers downstream with its own cement. The implementation of this 
announcement in February 2002 led to an increase in the (agreed) quotas for Readymix and 
was therefore interpreted as deviation from the agreement by the other cartel members. The 
official investigation of the alleged cement cartel started on 4 July 2002 with dawn raids by 
the FCO on the premises of 30 cement companies in Germany.5 
 During the hearings before the Higher Regional Court, it was heavily discussed how the 
substantial drop in the price index after the disclosure of the cartel must be interpreted. 
Although a price drop as such is naturally expected after a cartel breakdown, it was argued by 
the defendants that the price drop was partly caused by a price war, i.e., the observed bottom 
                                                            
5  Source: Press release of the German Federal Cartel Office on 8 July 2002, ‘Searches conducted in companies 
in the cement sector’ available at www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/ArchivNews2002/ 
2002_07 _08.php (last accessed on 12 May 2012). 
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price cannot be interpreted as the competitive level but a level below that. Eventually, the 
court identified the acquisition of cartel breaker Readymix by Cemex as crucial event for the 
derivation of the but-for price, partly because the cement price index increased substantially 
in the aftermath of this event.6  
 
4 Estimating the price overcharge of the German cement cartel  
In this section, we use publicly available data to estimate the price overcharge of the German 
cement cartel. In particular, we apply two different comparator-based methods: the ‘before-
and-after-approach’ and the ‘difference-in-difference approach’. We use price index data 
continuously collected by the German Federal Statistical Office (FSO). Major German cement 
producers are approached with a questionnaire and asked to provide overview information 
(including prices, quantities and qualities) on one representative CEM I sale activity close to 
the date of data collection (which is the 15th of a month). As this data collection approach is 
highly standardized and used across a larger number of (cartelized and non-cartelized) firms, 
it offers possibilities for strategic behavior, e.g., with respect to the choice of the invoice 
handed over by the addressed firms to the FSO.     
4.1 The ‘before-and-after’ approach  
A prominent comparator-based approach refers to the analysis of price time series. Based on 
the brief characterization of the general concept in Section 2.1.1 above, we will apply an 
‘after’ approach in the following.  
4.1.1 Basic econometric approach     
In the basic econometric approach, we take the cartel period – identified during the public 
enforcement trial – as given and further assume that the end of the cartel led to an immediate 
transition to the competitive price. We further assume that the price-determining variables are 
identical during and after the cartel leaving the cartel agreement as the only difference 
between both periods. We therefore define the following regression equation:  
          C L E Ligt cart L t t t tcart E Lig cpro td tp p p p c tD prod              (1) 
The cement price index at time t (ptC) is determined by the constant term α and the following 
cost- or demand-related variables which vary over time. With respect to cost determinants, we 
include the price index for lime (ptL), the price index for electricity (ptE) and the price index 
for lignite (ptLig). The demand side is represented through the inclusion of the index for 
                                                            
6  It is important to note that the decision of the Higher Regional Court refers to public enforcement only 
(following criminal law standards), i.e., its decisions are not binding for the ongoing private enforcement 
lawsuit (following civil law standards).  
 12
cement production (cprodt). In order to estimate the effect of the cartel, we include the 
dummy variable Dcart in the regression equation. The corresponding coefficient βcart shows the 
difference of the price index between the cartel period and the non-cartel period. Finally, t is a 
time trend variable and εt is the error term. Table 2 below shows the results of a simple OLS 
regression based on data from January 1995 to December 2009.  
Table 2: Regression Results (OLS) 
Variable Coefficient Sign. Level (Std. Error) 
Cartel Period 0.188 *** (0.020) 
Price Index Lime 1.224 *** (0.133) 
Price Index Electricity 0.047  (0.073) 
Price Index Lignite 0.612 *** (0.150) 
Index Cement Production 0.020 * (0.011) 
Trend 0.001 *** (0.000) 
Constant  -0.356 *** (0.073) 
Number of Observations 180 
F(6, 173) 147.54*** 
R² 0.72 
Remarks: Significance Level: *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1; Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses.  
Source: Federal Statistical Office, BDZ, Own Calculations. 
The table shows the estimation results for the case of the logarithm of the respective variables. 
It is revealed that the price difference between the cartel period and the non-cartel period (i.e., 
the price overcharge) is exp(0.188)-1=20.7%. If we assume an average cement price of EUR 
55 per ton, the price overcharge can be calculated to be EUR 11.38 per ton. With respect to 
the relationship between the cement price and the lime price, the regression results reveal that 
a 1% increase in the price of lime leads to a 1.224% increase in the price of cement. For the 
lignite price index, we find that a price increase of 1% leads to an increase of the cement price 
of 0.612%. Interestingly, we find no statistically significant effect for the price of electricity 
on the price for cement. This is surprising given the high energy-intensity of the cement 
production process. Last but not least, we find a positive relationship between the production 
of cement and the price of cement. This result is understandable given the fact that cement is 
not easy to store and therefore largely produced on demand. 
4.1.2 Extensions of the basic econometric approach 
In the following two sub-sections we extend the basic econometric approach in two separate 
ways. First, we introduce an instrumental variable to take the usual interdependence between 
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prices and quantities into account. Second, we assume a transition period from the cartel to 
the non-cartel period. 
4.1.2.1 Introduction of an instrumental variable  
A key problem ignored by the basic econometric approach is the interdependence of cement 
price and cement demand. In a non-monopolistic market a mutual reaction can be expected as, 
on the one hand, an increase in the demand leads to an increase in the willingness to pay. 
Producers are therefore able to charge a higher price per unit. On the other hand, a decrease in 
price, e.g., due to an improved production technology, leads to an increase in demand for the 
respective product. As a consequence, interdependencies between price and demand exist 
which cannot be disentangled and therefore cause difficulties in an investigation of the impact 
of cement demand on cement price. From an econometric perspective, ignoring the 
interdependence can cause serious consequences in the form of biased coefficients and 
therefore possibly erroneous estimates of the impact of cement demand on cement price. 
In order to solve the endogeneity issue, we have to create a relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. In the following, we will instrument cement demand. A 
key question in this respect is which factors influence cement demand. As soon as we can 
identify one or more factors which influence cement demand but not (directly) the cement 
price, these factors can be seen as valid instruments.  
Cement is largely used as an input good in the construction business. As the cement costs 
typically account for only a small fraction of entire construction costs (e.g., around 3% for the 
construction of a single-family home), it is reasonable to assume that the construction 
decision does not depend on the price for cement. It can therefore be concluded that the 
demand for cement depends on construction activity, however, no (significant) effect of the 
cement price on construction activity can be assumed.     
In the following extended estimation approach, we refrain from including cement 
production itself as independent variable but instrument cement production by several new 
variables which reflect construction activity. We start off by determining the influence of 
different construction variables on cement production and continue by deriving a separate 
value of cement production for every point in time. As the estimated (derived) value does not 
represent the actual cement production any more, it can be included into the estimation 
equation of the basic approach described above. Technically, in a first step, we explain 
cement production by the following model: 
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 (2) 
The first two lines in equation (2) measure the impact of the so-called instruments. We 
include the following seven variables: Domestic Construction (DC), Industrial Surface 
Construction (ISC), Surface Construction for Public Law Bodies (SCPLB), Surface 
Construction for Non-Profit Bodies (SCNPB), Road Construction (RC), Industrial 
Underground Construction (IUC) and Underground Construction for Public Law Bodies 
(UCPLB). In addition, the remaining variables are also used as further instruments in the 
second step of the analysis. In our case, these variables are taken from the basic model 
estimated above. The estimated value of the index of cement production is inserted into the 
basic model derived above:  
 Z p p p L p E p Lig p pt cart cart t E t Lig t cprod t ttLD cprodp p p p t              (3) 
The results of the respective second level estimations are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Regression Analysis (Instrument Variable Estimation –                                
Second Level Coefficients) 
Variable Coefficient Sign. Level (Std. Error) 
Cartel Period 0.185 *** (0.020) 
Price Index Lime 1.234 *** (0.132) 
Price Index Electricity 0.038  (0.074) 
Price Index Lignite 0.631 *** (0.155) 
Index Cement Production (instrumented) 0.028 ** (0.012) 
Trend 0.001 *** (0.000) 
Constant -0.349 *** (0.074) 
First Level  
Number of Observations  180 
F(12, 167) 63.80*** 
(adj.) R² 0.81 
Second Level  
Number of Observations  180 
F(6, 173) 154.05 *** 
R² 0.72 
Remarks: Significance Level: *** <0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1; Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in 
parentheses.  
Source: Federal Statistical Office, BDZ, Own Calculations. 
Comparing the results of the basic regression approach with the results of the extended 
regression approach reveals that the coefficients are very similar with respect to both direction 
and size. In particular, the price overcharge remains largely unaffected by the inclusion of the 
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instrumented variable with a value of exp(0.185)-1=20.32%. Again, we find no statistically 
significant effect for the price of electricity on the price for cement. 
4.1.2.2 Modeling a transition period from the cartel to the non-cartel state  
The model approaches so far assumed that the cartel period is immediately followed by the 
non-cartel period. However, for several reasons, it is reasonable to assume that the breakdown 
of a cartel agreement is followed by a transition period from the cartel to the non-cartel state. 
First, even after cartel detection, forms of tacit collusion might still have some impact leading 
to a lagged price decline down to the competitive level. Second, in many upstream product 
markets, medium- and long-term contracts may lead to certain price persistence even after the 
cartel breakdown. Third, price rigidities can play a more general role, e.g. in the sense that 
cost changes are not reflected immediately in respective price changes.   
 The likely existence of a transition period from the cartel to the non-cartel period demands 
an econometric approach that explicitly takes this period into account. As the transition period 
is caused by the cartel agreement, the smaller but still elevated prices in the transition period 
must be included into the price overcharge estimation and the subsequent calculation of 
damages. As the actual transition process is not known, an econometric model has to consider 
simplified assumptions on the transition period. In particular, the following three questions 
must be assessed. First, up to which point in time did the high cartel prices prevail after the 
cartel breakdown? Second, over which period does the transition from the cartel to the non-
cartel state take place? Third, which functional form does the transition process follow? 
  One possibility for the modeling of the price development in the transition period is to 
assume a linear price development by introducing an indicator variable with the value ‘1’ 
during the cartel and the transition period and the value ‘0’ otherwise. Although indicator 
variables by definition have two specifications, a graduation can be implemented quite easily. 
A value of ‘1’ of the indicator variable basically means that the price at this particular point in 
time contains the full price overcharge of the cartel. If the indicator variable reaches a value of 
‘0.5’ after the breakdown of the cartel, the respective price still contains half of the price 
overcharge of the cartel and so on. Figure 3 sketches two examples of transition periods and 
their impact on the respective price overcharge estimations. 
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Figure 3: Design of the Indicator Variable ‚Cartel Period‘ 
Source: Own Figure 
Instead of an introduction of a continuous indicator variable, it would alternatively be possible 
to introduce an additional indicator variable which has a value of ‘1’ in the transition period 
and a value of ‘0’ otherwise. Although such a solution does not assume a specific functional 
form, it still allows accounting of the transition period.   
Based on this brief general discussion of the relevance of considering the transition, we 
continue by comparing the effect of different transition periods on the price overcharge 
estimate. In the following, we apply the extended econometric model (following the 
instrument variable approach) and include the transition period in the estimation of the price 
overcharge. In particular, we differentiate between three transition periods: January to April 
2002 (columns (1) and (2) in Table 4), January to June 2002 (columns (3) and (4)) and 
January to July (columns (5) and (6)). As reference point, column (0) in Table 4 repeats the 
results of the estimation of the extended econometric model above. Models (1), (3) and (5) 
use an indicator variable to mark the transition period (which is treated as part of the cartel 
period). In models (2), (4) and (6), a continuous transition is assumed, i.e. in column (2), the 
indicator variable has a value of 0.8 in January, a value of 0.6 in February and so on.     
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Table 4: Instrument Variable Estimation with Various Transition Periods 
 
Remarks: Significance Level: *** 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1; Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Federal Statistical Office, BDZ, Own Calculations. 
 Control Period is …  Cartel Period w/o Transition 
Cartel Period + 
Period 01/04 
Cartel Period + 
contin. Transition 
01/04 
Cartel Period + 
Period 01/06 
Cartel Period + 
contin. Transition 
01/06 
Cartel Period + 
Period 01/07 
Cartel Period + 
contin. Transition 
01/07 
Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. 
(Std.e.) Level (Std.e.) Level (Std.e.) Level (Std.e.) Level (Std.e.) Level (Std.e.) Level (Std.e.) Level 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Control Period 0.185 *** 0.207 *** 0.213 *** 0.218 *** 0.225 *** 0.223 *** 0.231 *** 
  (0.020)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Price Index Lime 1.234 *** 1.021 *** 1.164 *** 0.863 *** 1.100 *** 0.772 *** 1.026 *** 
  (0.132)  (0.134) (0.128) (0.131)  (0.120) (0.125) (0.113)
Price Index Electricity 0.038  0.164 ** 0.114 * 0.215 *** 0.149 ** 0.241 *** 0.182 *** 
  (0.074)  (0.066) (0.062) (0.067)  (0.060) (0.068) (0.060)
Price Index Lignite 0.631 *** 0.524 *** 0.513 *** 0.574 *** 0.494 *** 0.606 *** 0.489 *** 
  (0.155)  (0.120) (0.119) (0.119)  (0.111) (0.120) (0.108)
Index Cement Production  0.028 ** 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.023 ** 0.029 *** 0.019 ** 0.028 *** 
(instrumented) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Trend 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.349 *** -0.454 *** -0.455 *** -0.490 *** -0.500 *** -0.511 *** -0.525 *** 
  (0.074)  (0.067) (0.064) (0.067)  (0.062) (0.066) (0.061)
Number of Observations  180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
First Level    
F-Test (12, 167) 63.80 *** 62.48 *** 62.90 *** 61.72 *** 62.92 *** 61.99 *** 62.65*** 
(adj.) R² 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81 
Second Level   
F-Test (6, 173) 154.05 *** 198.18 *** 207.13 *** 228.20 *** 241.75 *** 248.14 *** 271.20 *** 
R² 0.72 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.85 
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A comparison of the coefficients in the different columns in Table 4 reveals that an 
extension of the cartel period through the introduction of transition periods leads to significant 
increases in the estimated price overcharges (models (1), (3) and (5)). For example, if we 
include the transition period until April 2002 into the cartel period, we receive a price 
overcharge of 23.00% (=exp(0.207)-1) in model 1 compared to a price overcharge of 20.32% 
(=exp(0.185)-1) in the model without any transition period (model (0)).   
If instead a linear reduction of the indicator variable over the transition period is assumed 
(models (2), (4) and (6)), the respective coefficient increases further (23.7%, 25.2% and 
26.0%). This can be explained by the fact that within the transition period, the higher values 
of the price index close to the cartel period are allocated with a larger share to the non-cartel 
period. For the cement market with its partly medium- and long-term supply contracts, it is 
reasonable to assume that a linear reduction of the indicator variable provides a better fit than 
a “0-1” dummy variable can do. 
4.2 The ‚difference-in-differences‘ approach 
In this section, we apply a second model approach to estimate the price overcharge of the 
German cement cartel: the so-called ‘difference-in-differences’ (DiD) approach. As described 
in Section 2.1.2 above, the DiD approach combines the ‘before-and-after’ approach with a 
geographic or product-related comparator approach. The approach also takes into account that 
not the entire price difference between the cartel period and the post-cartel period must be 
related to the cartel agreement but can also be influenced by other factors such as changes in 
various cost drivers. Ignoring the possible impact of these additional factors might lead to 
under- or overestimations of the price overcharge. The DiD approach considers these factors 
by assuming that these cost drivers do not differ across different geographical comparator 
markets. Technically, we implement the DiD approach by estimating the following equation:  
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     
      (4) 
with Kt being the indicator variable which has a value of ‚1‘ during the cartel period and ‚0‘ 
otherwise. Dm is the indicator variable which has a value of ‚1‘ in the cartelized market m (in 
our case Germany) and ‚0‘ in other markets (other countries in our case). The DiD-estimator 
of the price overcharge is coefficient β3 of the interaction term Dm*Kt. As the available price 
data in all cases are indices, we again use the logarithm of the respective index values, i.e., we 
investigate the percentage increase of the ‘but-for’ price (which can be derived by exp(β3)-1).   
As control variables, we include the logarithm of the respective energy price indices (pmtE), 
a trend variable (Yeart) and seasonal effects by introducing quarter dummies (Q2t-Q4t). As the 
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first quarter acts as reference period, the coefficients β6 to β8 measure the percentage 
difference of the cement price as compared to the first quarter.  
As geographical comparators, the following countries are used: Spain, France, the UK and 
Poland.7 Figure 4 below plots the respective national cement price indices for the period from 
1991 to 2008.  
0
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UK Spain France Germany Poland  
                        Remark:  January 2000=1 
Figure 4: National Cement Price Indices from 1991 to 2008 
Sources: Statistical Offices of the Respective Countries; Own Calculations. 
As shown in Figure 4, all national cement price indices show an increasing trend for the 
observation period. However, while the national indices of the UK, Spain, France and 
Germany are moving closely together from 1991 to 2002, the price reduction after the 
breakdown of the German cartel led to a substantial drop in the cement price index for 
Germany. The price index for Poland follows a rather different trend, partly triggered by the 
transition to a social market economy, the existence of a cement cartel (at least between 1998 
and 2006) and acquisition activities of large cement producers in the Polish market after 
liberalization.  
As argued above, energy prices are expected to be an important driver of cement prices. For 
an application of a DiD approach, it is therefore necessary to collect information on the 
energy price level in the respective countries. The national energy price indices from 1991 to 
2004 are plotted in Figure 5.  
                                                            
7  The chosen comparator countries might not be that suitable as cement cartels might have existed in those 
countries as well during the observation period. For example, the Polish competition authority recently fined 
a cement cartel that was operating in Poland at least from 1998 to 2006.   
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                    Remark:  January 2000=1 
Figure 5: National Energy Price Indices from 1991 to 2004 
Sources: OECD/IEA; Own Calculations. 
Poland again shows a rather special development of its energy price index basically due to the 
transition period described above. The national energy price indices of the other countries in 
the sample show similar and rather constant developments in the 1990s but experience 
substantial increases since 2002. Table 5 finally provides the descriptive statistics of all model 
variables used in the DiD estimation.   
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the ‘Difference-in-Differences‘ Model 
 Cement Price Index Energy Price Index 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  
     
Germany 0.962 0.053 1.029 0.091 
Spain 0.971 0.068 0.947 0.104 
France 0.981 0.069 0.901 0.106 
United Kingdom 0.936 0.098 0.887 0.103 
Poland 0.853 0.428 0.790 0.373 
                            Remark: Period 1991-2004 
Sources: Cement Price Indices: Statistical Offices of the Respective Countries; Energy Price Indices: 
OECD/IEA; Own Calculations.  
 
As shown in the table, the standard deviation of both the cement price index and the energy 
price index is substantially higher for Poland than for the other countries in the sample. This 
observation can largely be explained by a much more pronounced increase in the cement 
prices in Poland compared to the other countries between 1991 and 2004. 
 In the following, we estimate equation (4) with three separate techniques. The so-called 
pooled model applies an OLS method and corrects the standard errors for a possible 
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correlation within a country (cluster-robust). In contrast, panel data methods (random-effects 
or fixed-effects) are able to consider an additional unobservable, time invariant but individual 
effect (here countries) and therefore increase the quality of the estimation. The estimation 
results for all three techniques are shown in Table 6.      
Table 6: Regression Results (‚Difference-in-differences‘) 
 Pooled Model (OLS) Random-effects Fixed-effects 
          
Variables Coeffi- 
cient 
 Std. 
Err. 
Coeffi-
cient 
 Std.  
Err. 
Coeffi- 
cient 
 Std.  
Err. 
         
Cartel Period  0.017 (0.024) 0.017 (0.025) 0.017 (0.025) 
Germany -0.311 *** (0.030) -0.312*** (0.030)   
Cartel 
Period*Germany 
0.235 *** (0.022) 0.233*** (0.021) 0.233 *** (0.021) 
log(Energy Price 
Index) 
1.015 *** (0.059) 1.024*** (0.067) 1.025 *** (0.068) 
Year 0.001 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 
Second Quarter 0.023 (0.011) 0.023** (0.011) 0.023 (0.011) 
Third Quarter 0.018 (0.013) 0.018 (0.013) 0.018 (0.013) 
Fourth Quarter -0.012 * (0.004) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.012 ** (0.004) 
Constant -0.995 (9.631) -0.105 (10.377) -0.134 (10.402) 
       
Number of observ.  840  840  840  
Countries 5  5  5  
R2 (within)   0.946  0.946  
R2 (between)   0.971  0.589  
R2 / R2 (overall) 0.949  0.949  0.821  
Remarks: Significance Level: *** <0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1; Heteroscedasticity-consistent and cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: Statistical Offices of the Respective Countries and OECD/IEA; Own Calculations.  
As shown in Table 6, especially energy costs are now found to be an important determinant of 
the cement price. Elasticities vary from 1.015 to 1.025 depending on the model approach; 
however, the Wald test reveals that these values are statistically not different from each other. 
The coefficient of the Germany-dummy (β2) is statistically significant and clearly negative 
indicating that cement prices in Germany in the period from 1991-2004 increased less than in 
the comparator countries. This fact was already shown in Figure 4 above which plotted the 
cement price indices of the respective countries in the sample. The estimated price overcharge 
is shown in the third (bold) line in Table 6. For the pooled model, a price overcharge of 
exp(0.235)-1=26.5% is found which is slightly reduced for the panel data estimations 
((0.233)-1=26.2%). The decision whether the random-effects or the fixed-effects method 
provides the better fit can be made by conducting the Hausman test. In our case, the results of 
the Hausman test show no systematic differences between both estimations suggesting that 
the ‘random-effect’ estimation should be favored due to its better efficiency characteristic.   
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 The identified differences between the price overcharge estimates of the ‘before-and-after’ 
approach (20.3% to 26.0%) and the ‘difference-in-differences’ approach (26.2% to 26.5%) 
demand a brief discussion of possible explanations. First, both model approaches use data sets 
of different lengths. While the before-and-after estimates refer to data from 1995 to 2009, data 
limitations only allowed us to use data from 1991 to 2004 for the DiD approach. As a 
consequence, price overcharges are not fully comparable. Second, the larger value of the DiD 
estimations can be explained by the fact that especially in the post-cartel period substantial 
increases in the cement price have been observed in the comparator countries driving the (D-
C) term of the DiD approach negative. Third, it cannot be ruled out that cement cartels were 
operating in several other comparator countries as well. Such parallel cartels would also be 
likely to lead to biased estimates. 
5 Conclusion 
There is no question that the fight against hardcore cartels is ranked high on the agenda of 
antitrust authorities these days. For example, the former European Commissioner responsible 
for competition policy, Neelie Kroes8, frequently stated that one key aim of her work was not 
only to “… merely destabilize cartels. I want to tear the ground from under them”. The first 
cartel actions taken by her successor, Joaquín Almunia9, left no doubt that “[t]he Commission 
will continue its relentless fight against cartels”. 
 The overall strategy of the European Commission to enforce anti-cartel rules can be 
subdivided into two different strands. On the one hand, the Commission fosters public 
enforcement, e.g., through the introduction of a leniency program, increased cooperation 
between different national antitrust authorities or the extension of the fine spectrum for 
antitrust infringements. On the other hand, the Commission has started to strengthen the 
private enforcement of antitrust laws, e.g., through the launching of a large project on the 
development of a legal framework that allows victims of EU antitrust infringements to obtain 
compensation. As the size of the compensation – in the case of hardcore cartels – depends on 
the demanded quantities of the cartelized product and the cartel-induced increase in price, it 
becomes apparent that especially the robust estimation of the so-called price overcharge is 
crucial for a coherent and welfare-improving private enforcement of anti-cartel rules.   
 Against this background, we use publicly available price data from a German cement cartel 
to estimate the achieved price overcharge. In particular, we apply two different comparator-
based approaches – a ‘before-and-after’ approach and a ‘difference-in-differences’ approach – 
                                                            
8  Kroes, N., Tackling Cartels – A Never-Ending Task, European Commission SPEECH/09/454, 8 October 
2009, Brussels. 
9  Almunia, J., First Cartel Decision under Settlement Procedure – Introductory Remarks, European 
Commission  SPEECH/10/247, 19 May 2010, Brussels. 
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and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel 
period to the non-cartel period on the estimated price overcharge. We find that the cartel 
managed to implement price increases in a range from 20.3% (extended approach with 
instrumented cement demand) to 20.7% (basic approach) for the ‘before-and-after’ method 
and from 26.2% (pooled OLS) to 26.5% (random-effects) for the ‘difference-in-differences’ 
method. For the (extended) ‘before-and-after’ approach, we further show that various 
assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel period have a 
significant impact on the estimated price overcharge. While the absence of a transition period 
leads to a price overcharge of 20.3%, a continuous transition period from January to July 
2002 arrives at an overcharge estimate of 26.0%. It therefore becomes apparent that the 
choice of the transition period has a substantial impact on the estimated price overcharge and 
should therefore become a compulsory step in cartel damage estimations. 
 Although the paper investigates the impact of one particular cartel in one particular 
industry in one particular country, our results point towards several fruitful future research 
areas. First, the co-existence of public and private enforcement activities raises the demand 
for studies which investigate the interrelationships between both enforcement types. 
Thoughtful answers to the question whether the EU might be confronted with a situation of 
socially inefficient over-enforcement – as soon as the already existing public enforcement 
regime is complemented by more and more private initiatives to enforce anti-cartel laws – 
will be particularly important for the design of a coherent and efficient general enforcement 
regime.   
 Second, within the system of private enforcement, our analysis showed that different 
methods and models will typically lead to different overcharges (and therefore different 
damage estimates). In court, this constellation will often cause a resource-intensive battle 
between defendants and plaintiffs for the true damage estimate. In an attempt to improve this 
complex situation, the UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills (2012) proposed the 
introduction of a rebuttable presumption of loss in cartel cases: “This would be likely to take 
the form of a presumption that a cartel had affected prices by a fixed amount, such as 20% … 
If no economic evidence was presented by either side, the damages award would be based on 
this assumption. The presumption would be rebuttable by either the claimant or defendant; 
however, to do so they would have to present the necessary evidence …” (Department for 
Business Innovation & Skills (2012), p. 24). Although the proposal has clear advantages such 
as the promotion of the incentives for harmed parties to start litigation against cartelists or the 
shift of the burden of proof to the party most likely to possess the data necessary to calculate 
the true damages, it seems rather unlikely that such a rule will have a substantially negative 
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effect on average litigation costs. The defendants will still provide evidence that the true 
damage is substantially below 20 percent and the plaintiffs are likely to respond with 
opposing empirical evidence.  
 Although it is indisputable that private antitrust enforcement in the European Union is still 
in its infancy – with substantial improvement potential yet to be realized – it becomes 
apparent that the final success will crucially depend on how close lawyers and economists are 
willing and able to work together. Lawyers could promote such a mutual learning process by 
becoming more open to economic analysis while economists are in demand to provide clear 
guidance to lawyers in the crucial aspects of the economics of damage estimations. In the 
coming years, it will be interesting to observe how well this interdisciplinary cooperation 
works and therefore how much the private enforcement of anti-cartel laws will contribute to 
the overall benefits of competition law and policy in the European Union.   
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